In contest experiments, overbidding is a widely observed phenomenon. One common explanation for overbidding is that winning in itself yields utility, termed the joy of winning. However, the joy of winning is di¢ cult to observe and to quantify. This paper develops a novel, incentivized way to measure the individual-speci…c joy of winning as well as the frustration of losing in a Tullock lottery contest. We …nd that the willingness to pay for a restart of the contest di¤ers between winners and losers. Compared to a theoretical benchmark, winners are more satis…ed and overbid for restart of the contest, while losers are less satis…ed and underbid. Further, e¤ort levels are higher in the second contest, which can be explained by selection of high e¤ort types with a high joy of winning into the restarted contest.
Introduction
Redistributing resources by …ghting a contest may in addition to allocative implications also have more subtle consequences for the contest participants:
The winner of the contest may enjoy the pride and happiness of winning and being …rst, while the loser of the contest may su¤er from his failure and be frustrated by having exerted e¤ort in vain. This may be true for a variety of contests between individual decision-makers, be it promotion contests, sports contests or political contests. For some applications such as cardboard games, victory even comes without any allocative or monetary consequences. In these contests, especially if there is a lot of randomness in individual performance, non-monetary e¤ects such as the so-called joy of winning seem to be a major motivation for why people strive to be …rst.
In the experimental economics literature, this joy of winning has been used to explain overexpenditure in lottery contests, compared to a theoretical benchmark. 1 The intuition is that players value the prize higher than its pure monetary value, in other words, they derive additional utility from the fact that they have won. If the extent of the additional utility di¤ers across individuals, the joy of winning can not only explain the overexpenditure, but also the heterogeneity in contest e¤orts observed. Due to its explanatory power, the existence of a joy of winning is increasingly accepted in the literature discussing experimental contests. The acceptance is also re ‡ected by the fact that more and more theory models on lottery contests include it. 2 Nevertheless, there is little undisputed empirical evidence for such a joy of winning in experimental contests. The lack of strong empirical evidence is the main motivation for this paper.
The most prominent test for an inherent joy of winning in experimental contests has been developed by Sheremeta (2010) : After the main part of a contest experiment, players can invest e¤ort in another contest, in which the prize value is set to zero. That is, the players are actually …ghting for nothing. The e¤ort expended in this zero-prize-contest is then taken as a measure for the joy of winning. This post-test has been implemented by a number of recent contest experiments (e.g., Brookins Yet, some open questions remain: Are some players just too tired and fatigued at the end of the experiment that they do not pay full attention to the experimental task? Are their e¤ort choices in a zero-prize-contest therefore merely a repetition of previous e¤ort choices? Thus, the reliability of this measure is questionable. Moreover, the e¤ort in a zero-prize-contest is a one-sided measure in that it cannot yield any insights on the frustration of losing. Without further controls, it is also impossible to disentangle the joy of winning from the joy of playing a lottery.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we introduce an alternative experimental way to measure the joy of winning. Second, we also measure the frustration of losing, which allows us to test for asymmetries between being ahead and behind. We test for both of these non-monetary utility e¤ects in two di¤erent ways, one incentivized and one non-incentivized. For the incentivized part, two players …rst take part in a Tullock lottery contest. Once they know their realized payo¤s, they can place a (negative or positive) bid for playing again. The model framework yields a prediction for this bid for playing again, against which we can compare the observed bid. With this comparison, we can test for over-or underbidding as regards playing the contest again. Additionally, we can di¤erentiate between players that have won or lost prior to the decision on bidding for a restart. For the non-incentivized part, the players are asked about their current satisfaction level with respect to their experience in the experiment right before and right after the contest. This is in line with the usual practice of using self-reported emotional states and is a proxy for player's utility. An additional contribution is that we dive further into some di¤erent dimensions of the joy of winning and the frustration of losing. More speci…cally, we test whether the joy of winning and the frustration of losing depend on the outcome being expected or unexpected and on the outcome seeming to be narrow or clear.
The results show that compared to the prediction, winners bid too much for a restart of the contest and losers bid too little, indicating a joy of winning for winners and a frustration of losing for losers. Emotionally, winners report to be more satis…ed than losers, although the di¤erence can be explained by monetary payo¤s. Both measures of the joy of winning, overbidding and the change in satisfaction, are signi…cantly positively correlated, but they are uncorrelated with the e¤ort players expend in a zero-prize contest (Sheremeta, 2010) . Furthermore, e¤ort levels in the repeated contest are higher. This alludes to both selection and behavioral e¤ects: The restarted contests attracts high e¤ort types and induces stronger competition. This paper is related to di¤erent strands of the literature. First and foremost, Sheremeta (2010) developed a direct test for the joy of winning in experimental contests as discussed above. Yet, the joy of winning has also been under investigation in other contexts. With a psychometric approach, i.e. analyzing data from extensive questionnaires, Franken and Brown (1995) analyze how the importance of winning di¤ers between di¤erent individuals. Ding et al. (2005) study how the joy of winning in ‡uences bids in internet auctions. Malhotra (2010) also uses bids in online auctions to study competitive arousal from a decision-making aspect, which is also the focus of a paper by Malhotra et al. (2008) . Co¤ey and Maloney (2010) study the "thrill of victory" with data from dog and horse races. Unlike these papers, we are interested in the joy of winning in the experimental laboratory. The laboratory also provides a controlled environment and the possibility to incentivize individual decisions from which we deduce the joy of winning and the frustration of losing.
The consequences of winning and of losing are the focus of some other papers: Bühren and Pleß ner (2014) show that winners are more likely to pay for actually getting a physical trophy, Kidd et al. (2013) …nd that winning increases generosity, especially if winning comes unexpectedly, and Buser (forthcoming) shows that following a loss, players set a higher performance target for themselves. We also look at the consequences of winning or losing, with a special interest on the player's willingness to play the contest once more. This yields a simple measure for the joy of winning and the frustration of losing at the same time.
One of the …rst papers to study emotions in the laboratory more generally is by Mellers et al. (1997 In the next Section we introduce the model framework, line out the experimental design and explain our hypotheses. We analyze and discuss the empirical data in Section 3 and provide concluding remarks in Section 4.
Framework

Theory background
There are two players A and B that …ght for a prize of monetary value V in a Tullock lottery contest. In a …rst stage, both players simultaneously choose e¤ort x i , i = A; B, which in ‡uences their winning probability. The unit cost of e¤ort is assumed to be constant and equal to one. Player i's probability of winning the prize is equal to
that is, i's expected payo¤ is equal to his probability of winning multiplied by the prize, minus the e¤ort cost. Player i maximizes his expected payo¤ E i and invests x i = V 4 in equilibrium. This yields an equilibrium expected payo¤ of E i = V 4 . By construction, there will be a winner and a loser in this contest. Realized ex post payo¤s are W = V x W for the winner and L = x L for the loser, where x W and x L describe the e¤ort exerted by the winner and loser, respectively.
Once the realized payo¤s are known, players can bid b i 2 [ V; V ], i = A; B, for a restart of the contest in a second stage. If the sum of these bids, b A + b B , is positive, the game is restarted. A restart means that the payo¤ from the former contest is cancelled and instead the payo¤ from the new contest will be relevant for payment. Otherwise, if b A + b B 6 0, the payo¤ from the former contest is relevant for payment and the players do not enter into the second contest. In our setup, inspired by the Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanism, only the pivotal player actually pays a bid to the laboratory and the absolute value of this bid is determined by the second-highest bid. The …nal payment that players earn in the contest stage will thus be either the payo¤ from the new contest minus a positive bid for a restart (i.e. plus the the negative bid of the other non-pivotal player) if the player was pivotal in the decision for a restart (case 1 below), the payo¤ from the new contest (case 2 below), the payo¤ from the old contest (case 3 below) or the payo¤ from the old contest minus a negative bid for a restart (i.e. plus the positive bid of the other non-pivotal player) if the player was pivotal in the decision against a restart (case 4 below). Formally, …nal earnings
Given this setup, the players who value a restart positively (losers) have no incentive to understate their willingness to pay, but may have an incentive to overstate their willingness to pay. 3 The players who value a restart negatively value (winners), on the other hand, might have an incentive to understate their willingness to pay, but never have an incentive to overstate their willingness to pay. 4 As an illustration take a winner who has invested x W = 150 in the …rst contest (corresponding to a payo¤ of W = 350), which he takes into account when deciding on his bid, and expects E new = 125. His true value for a restart is thus b i = 225. If he expects the Here, we concentrate on the equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in which both players state their true willingness to pay. Thus, both players bid their true value of a restart, i.e.
that is, players bid the expected payo¤ from the restarted contest, E i;new , minus the payo¤ from the old contest that will be cancelled if the second contest is played, i;old . Therefore, in equilibrium we have b W = V 2 for the winner and b L = V 2 for the loser. Hence, the sum of both bids is zero in this sharp equilibrium prediction and the contest is never restarted.
Experimental procedures
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 ) and run at the econlab laboratory in Munich, Germany. Subjects were recruited from the student body of Munich universities using ORSEE (Greiner 2004 ). We admitted 8 subjects to each session (104 participants in total), giving us 26 independent observations (4 subjects per matchinggroup). Subjects were on average 26 years old, a quarter of them studied an economics-related subject and 53% were male.
At the beginning of each session, written instructions were distributed and read out loud (see Appendix A.5 for a translation of the instructions). To make sure that subjects understood the experiment, they had to complete a quiz. This quiz included multiple-choice questions on the tasks described in the instructions and the payo¤ consequences of di¤erent decisions. When the experiment started, subjects had to count the number of zeros in …ve rows of 15-digit number strings composed of "0"s and "1"s. 5 Upon successful completion of a series of these (which was guaranteed by immediate feedback and the chance to correct a mistake in case it occurred), subjects received 750 tokens (which corresponded to 15 euros) for this task. These tokens served as their endowment for the subsequent parts of the experiment. This real e¤ort task was implemented to avoid a house money e¤ect.
In order for subjects to get familiarized with the contest environment, there were four rounds of the contest against a computer-animated player. The rules of this …rst stage of the contest were as described above with the prize value being equal to V = 500 tokens. The subjects' maximum e¤ort choices were restricted to x max = V 2 , which is twice the equilibrium prediction and thus su¢ ciently far from a binding restriction. 6 Both players chose their e¤ort as , and we are grateful for access to their experimental program. 6 Admittedly, in the experiment about 15% of the observed e¤ort choices are at this limit. However, restricting e¤ort choices was necessary to avoid possibe overall losses of subjects in the experiment. a non-negative integer. The computer's e¤ort choices and their order were pre-selected by the experimenter and replicated typical e¤ort choices of human contestants in an experimental two-player Tullock lottery contest, i.e. there was some over-spending (on average 25% higher than the equilibrium prediction) and a tendency towards focal numbers (going for multiples of 25). The resulting win probabilities were illustrated in a circular area on the screen, with a pointer running clockwise determining the winner (compare the screenshot in Appendix A.1). Once the arrow had stopped, the subjects learned their payo¤ from this contest. The rounds against the computer provided ample learning opportunities for the subjects, with more than 90% of subjects experiencing both victory and loss in these rounds, although these rounds were not paid out and therefore involved no monetary consequences.
Before the subjects entered into the contest against a human contestant, they had to answer "how happy or satis…ed they are at the moment" (that is the translation of the exact wording in the experiment), on a scale from 0 to 10. For the contest, the subjects were randomly and anonymously matched in groups of two, with everything else equal to the contest rounds against the computer. Once subjects learned the outcome of the contest and the round was …nished, the next screen reminded players of their contest payo¤ and of the fact whether they had won or lost. They were then again asked about their current satisfaction. 7 By comparing this answer to the self-reported level of satisfaction before the contest, we have a direct measure for the e¤ect of winning or losing.
Afterwards, a new part started whose details were only announced to the subjects after they …nished the …rst contest against a human contestant. In this part, the subjects could place a (positive or negative) bid for eliminating the result from the …rst contest and playing another contest round. Apart from the new matching, the setup of the restarted contest was exactly as the former contest, also including the question on current satisfaction after learning the outcome of the restarted contest. We did not want the subjects to base their bidding decision on social preferences towards their speci…c co-player in the former contest, therefore, two players were again matched at random. Yet, we made sure to match a winner with a loser, although this feature was unknown to the subjects. A bid for a restart had to be a positive or negative integer between V and V . If the sum of both players'bids was positive, a new contest was played. Otherwise, if the sum of both players' bids was non-positive, the players moved directly on to the post-tests. In any case, only the pivotal player needed to pay a bid (i.e. he was to receive money if he placed a negative bid and was pivotal) and this was explained to the subjects in great detail and with a number of examples. 8 Subsequently, the subjects underwent a number of incentivized tests. First, we elicited their preferences for playing a lottery (which was similar to the contest, but subjects had to decide whether to invest a …xed amount of tokens at a given win probability), then their distributional preferences (subjects had to repeatedly make two-person allocation decisions, following Bartling et al. 2009 and Balafoutas et al. 2012) , e¤ort in Sheremeta's zero-prize contest (which is widely used as a measure for the joy of winning) and their ambiguity aversion. Moreover, in the questionnaire the subjects were asked about their risk aversion (see Dohmen et al. 2011b ), optimism, pessimism, loss aversion, experience in cardboard games and other competitions and a number of socioeconomic characteristics.
At the end of the experiment the subjects were paid separately and in private. The conversion rate was 50 tokens = 1 euro. Each participant received a show-up fee of 6 euros, the earnings (possibly negative) of the …rst or second contest against another human player (including bidding) and the payo¤ (also possibly negative) from one randomly selected post-experimental task. On average, subjects earned 25 euros (excluding the show-up fee), and a session took about one hour.
Hypotheses
In equilibrium the expected contest payo¤ is E i = V 4 . Rearranging the value of a restart (1), we get E i;new = b i + i;old , i.e. the expected payo¤ from a new contest should be equal to the bid for playing this contest plus the payo¤ from the old contest, where the latter two can both be observed in the experiment. Taking the two expressions for the expected payo¤ together, we have b i + i;old V 4 = 0. If players value playing the contest a second time higher than its monetary value, this expression will not be equal to zero, in other words E i;new 6 = E i , but E i;new = E i + i . Hence, the di¤erence i (our measure of interest) is given by
Even if the players expect to enjoy a joy of winning with some probability in the restarted contest, there should be no di¤erence between winners and losers. However, if the joy of winning (and equivalently, the frustration of losing) persist for whatever reason even after the monetary payo¤ from this contest is eliminated, then only winners include a joy of winning in their expected payo¤ of a future contest and losers include a frustration of losing in their expected payo¤ of a future contest. According to this interpretation, we expect that the term i is positive for winners of the …rst contest and that i is negative for losers of the …rst contest. Independent of winning or losing, a possible (persistent) joy of playing the lottery would increase i . Hence, the number i that we …nd is an upper bound for the joy of winning and a lower bound for the frustration of losing. However, such a joy of playing the lottery cannot explain a di¤erence in the measure i between winners and losers.
Note that overbidding for playing again should not be confused with overexpenditure in the contest. Taking overexpenditure into account, the expected payo¤ from the restarted contest as well as the payo¤ from the old contest will be lower. 9 The latter is accounted for individually as this payo¤ is observed. The former cannot be observed directly, but it would work against a joy of winning, with a lower expected payo¤ from a restarted contest decreasing rather than increasing the bids for replay.
Let us now turn our attention to the non-incentivized measure. We expect to see an increase in satisfaction after winning the contest and a decrease in satisfaction after losing the contest. These measures can also be used to test whether the magnitude of the e¤ect on satisfaction is larger for winners or for losers.
Alongside the basic hypotheses on overbidding and increased satisfaction and the general measurement of the joy of winning, a special feature of the design allows us to test another hypothesis. Winning probabilities were illustrated by means of a fortune wheel with an arrow spinning clockwise on the screen. Hence, we have (visually) bare winners and losers versus sure winners and losers, depending on whether the arrow stopped close to the frontier between both players'winning regions or far away (compare the screenshots in Appendix A.1). We expect that the joy of winning and the frustration of losing are intensi…ed if the victory or the loss seemed to be a tight one.
Another angle is to look at really sure or tight outcomes, depending on the probabilities of winning. Although the theory predicts no di¤erence in these, Mellers et al. (1997) and Kidd et al. (2013) show that surprise enhances emotional reactions. Hence, it is informative to test whether the joy of winning is higher the lower the actual win probability of this player.
Results
Non-parametric analysis
We begin the analysis by comparing the bids that winners and losers place for playing the contest a second time. Irrespective of the expected payo¤ from the new contest, winners give up a gain whilst losers forego a loss when the payo¤ from the old contest is eliminated. Thus, if the players in the experiment have a correct understanding of their incentives, bids by winners should be lower than bids by losers. Table 1 shows that on average winners bid b W = 50:6 and losers bid b L = 55:7. (For comparison purposes, average expected bids are Eb W = 196:2 and Eb L = 245:8.) As predicted, there is a signi…cant di¤erence between the two groups (p-value < 0:01, Wilcoxon signed rank test at the matchinggroup level). The histogram of the bids (in Appendix A.2) shows that bids of winners are left-skewed and those of losers right-skewed. It also illustrates that more than 35 % of the bids fall in the narrow range from -10 to 10. Despite the fact that the sum of bids does not signi…cantly di¤er from zero, 46 % of the subjects moved on to a restart of the contest. The focus of this paper is to measure both, the joy of winning by the extent that winners overbid, and the frustration of losing by the extent that losers underbid. Therefore, we will now compare the observed bids with the theoretical prediction, taking into account individual payo¤s from the …rst contest. Does the measure i = b i + i;old V 4 , which measures the di¤erence of the observed bids to the expected value of a restart of the contest, di¤er between winners and losers? Table 1 presents evidence on a clear and signi…cant di¤erence between the joy of winning W = 145:6 and the frustration of losing L = 190:1 (pvalue < 0:01, tested at the matchinggroup level). Winners'bids are less negative than the predicted negative bids and losers bid a lower positive value than the predicted positive bids. The di¤erences are in line with our hypothesis that winning is valued more highly than the prize itself and that losing comes with some depression. The di¤erences cannot be explained by strategic incentives of the bidding mechanism, as winners may have an incentive to underbid, but not to overbid, and losers may have an incentive to overbid, but not to underbid, as explained above. Comparing the magnitude of both e¤ects we …nd that the frustration of losing is larger than the joy of winning (p-value = 0:09), which cannot be explained by a joy of playing the lottery because such a joy increases both numbers.
Result 1 After winning a contest, players bid more than the expected value of a restart for playing the contest again. After losing a contest, players bid less than the expected value of a restart for playing the contest again.
The scatterplot (in Appendix A.3) depicts the dispersion of bids across the bid-e¤ort-space. We …nd a clear dichotomy between winners and losers. There is only a very low number of subjects who underbid upon winning and overbid upon losing (5 subjects in total). The incentivized measure suggests that the joy of winning as well as the frustration of losing exist and that they vary across subjects and across e¤ort levels. 10 Now let us consider the satisfaction measure for the joy of winning. As a …rst plausibility check of the data, we compare the satisfaction of winners and losers after the …rst real contest. We …nd that on a scale from 0 to 10, winners on average report a level of s W = 7:85 and losers on average report a level of s L = 5:23, which is signi…cantly lower (p-value < 0:01, tested at the matchinggroup level). In principle, being inclined to be a winner and being in a generally happier mood could be systematically correlated. Thus, a cleaner test for the e¤ect of winning or losing on satisfaction can be obtained by looking at the change in satisfaction that is induced by the contest. Table 1 shows that the a¤ective reaction, i.e. the change in satisfaction s i , is positive for winners and negative for losers, reinforcing the result on the incentivized measure for the joy of winning. The magnitude of the di¤erence in satisfaction is basically the same for winners and losers (p-value = 0:94).
Result 2
The self-reported satisfaction of players who won a contest significantly increases, whereas the self-reported satisfaction of players who lost a contest signi…cantly decreases.
Remember that we also asked the subjects who replayed the contest for their current satisfaction after playing the second contest. Here, the reactions to winning or losing are even more pronounced with the change induced by winning the second contest being equal to s W = 1:41 and the change induced by losing the second contest being equal to s L = 2:85. Table 2 includes an analysis on a more detailed level, separating these e¤ects according to whether the player had been a winner or a loser in the former contest, i.e. whether the player's eliminated payo¤ was positive or negative. As before, the change in satisfaction is more positive if players end up being a winner in the new contest (for both rows, p-value = 0:07 for testing column di¤erences). The a¤ective reaction depends very much on the outcome of the former contest of which the payo¤ is eliminated: Independent of being a winner or a loser now, the change in satisfaction is more positive if the player had been a loser in the former contest (for both columns, p-value = 0:07 for testing row di¤erences).
Comparing all four cases, we observe an intuitive ordering. Playing the second contest yields the largest increase in happiness for players who have lost before and win now ( s 2;LW = 3:61), the reaction for players who win twice ( s 2;W W = 0:42) is somewhat smaller, the reaction for players who lose twice is negative and small ( s 2;LL = 0:61, which is not signi…cantly di¤erent from the e¤ect of winning two times in a row) and the happiness of players who have won before and lose now strongly decreases ( s 2;W L = 5:11, which is more than half the available scale). In line with our prediction, satisfaction of winners increases and satisfaction of losers decreases. Now let us check whether the intuition that the e¤ects are larger if the outcome is a visually tight one holds true. In …gure 1 we have separated the observations according to tight victories and losses on the one hand and sure victories and losses on the other hand. We classify an outcome as tight if the arrow on the fortune wheel determining the winner stopped within 18 degrees (i.e. 5% of the complete circle) towards the next border, and as a sure outcome if the arrow stopped further away from the next border. 11 The left panel depicts the bid di¤erences, which are positive for winners and negative for losers. Interestingly, the absolute value of this measure for the joy of winning and the frustration of losing is larger for tight outcomes (upper row) than for sure outcomes (lower row). The right panel depicts the change in satisfaction that is induced by the contest. Winner's satisfaction increases, while loser's satisfaction decreases, and in line with our intuition, the size of both of these e¤ects if stronger for narrow outcomes than for what seemed to be sure outcomes. Our prediction that visually tight outcomes lead to stronger reactions is qualitatively con…rmed for both joy of winning measures (bid di¤erence and satisfaction), yet we can only …nd statistical support for this statement for the case of testing bid di¤erences (p-value = 0:08; Mann Whitney U tests at the individual level on absolute values of bid di¤erences, for winners and losers jointly).
Result 3
If the arrow on the fortune wheel stops in close proximity to the border between both players' winning regions, di¤ erences of observed bids to predicted bids are signi…cantly higher and changes in satisfaction are higher than in the case in which the arrow stops far away from such a border.
Similar to the enhanced reaction when the arrow stops near the border between both winning regions, we expect that over-and underbidding as well as changes in satisfaction are magni…ed when the outcome comes as a surprise. Therefore, …gure 2 analyzes a speci…c subset of players for which winning (or losing) either comes as a surprise or is taken for granted, after both players have chosen their e¤orts and the winning probabilities are revealed. We assume that the subjects whose winning probability is smaller than one third expect to lose and that for these subjects winning comes as a surprise. On the other hand, the subjects with a winning probability larger than two thirds expect to win and for these subjects losing comes as a surprise. 12 The left panel of …gure 2 depicts over-and underbidding for playing the contest again. We …nd that the magnitude of the joy of winning and of the frustration of losing is larger when winning or losing comes as a surprise, with the di¤erence for losers being highly statistically signi…cant (p-value < 0:01, Mann Whitney U test at the individual level). The right panel shows that unexpected winning or losing also leads to a stronger reaction in self-reported satisfaction, although the di¤erence is only signi…cant for losers (p-value = 0:06, tested at the individual level). As expected, the joy of winning is higher the lower the actual win probability of this player.
The di¤erent dimensions of the joy of winning might alternatively be inves- 1 2 We get qualitatively the same results if we are working with more extreme probability values, but then the number of observations for the unexpected case drops further. tigated by a treatment variation with asymmetric players who di¤er in terms of their marginal costs of e¤ort. Then, the favorite's win probability is higher ex ante and we might expect that ceteris paribus the favorite has a higher frustration from losing than the underdog and the underdog has a higher joy of winning than the favourite. However, we look at the most simple case of players with symmetric cost of e¤ort whose role as favourite or underdog is only determined by their own e¤ort choices.
We have two measures for the joy of winning, the bid di¤erence and the change in self-reported satisfaction. Table 3 shows the Spearman correlation coe¢ cient and the corresponding p-value between both measures. We see that bid di¤erences are signi…cantly positively correlated with the change in satisfaction. 13 Of course, we are also interested in the relation between our measure and the measure that has been used by other studies: e¤ort in a zero-prize contest. The third row of table 3 shows that there is practically zero correlation between this measure and either of our measures. Yet, as hypothesized in the introduction, the e¤ort in this zero-prize contest is signi…cantly positively correlated with the e¤ort in the …rst contest against a human contestant (see the fourth row).
14 This speaks for the conjecture that (some) players just type in the same e¤ort in both, zero-prize contests and valuable-prize contests. In- terestingly, our joy of winning measures are uncorrelated with the e¤ort chosen in the former contest. Players had no possibility to base their decisions from which we compute both joy of winning measures on their e¤ort choices. In the next paragraph, we want to further investigate these e¤ort choices. Figure 3 shows the average e¤ort of players in the …rst contest against a human contestant (…rst bar from the left) and in the second contest against a human contestant if there was a restart (second bar from the left). We …nd that e¤ort in the restarted contest is signi…cantly higher (p-value < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank test at the matchinggroup level).
Result 4 Average e¤ ort in the restarted contest is signi…cantly higher than in the original contest.
The increase could be driven by two di¤erent e¤ects: 15 Either it is due to selection which happens if a speci…c subset of people who tend to exert a lot of e¤ort enters the second contest more often (because they bid more for replaying the contest). Or the e¤ort increase is a strategic reaction, because players know that they are …ghting against a speci…c subset of people (strategic) or because they have consciously chosen to replay the contest and are now very keen on winning (self-commitment). If the …rst (selection) e¤ect is true, …rst contest e¤ort by the players who proceed to play the second contest should be higher than …rst contest e¤ort by the players who do not proceed to play the second contest. The two bars on the right side of …gure 3 show that e¤ort by players who continue is higher on average, but the di¤erence between both types of players is only marginally statistically signi…cant (p-value = 0:11). What about the second (strategic) e¤ect? Does the e¤ort level of those players who play both contests di¤er between the …rst and second contest? Concentrating on the second and third bar in the center of the …gure, we see that e¤ort for this subset of players is higher in the second contest and we …nd this di¤erence to be statistically signi…cant (p-value = 0:03). 16 Hence, we cannot …rmly reject neither of the proposed explanations: The higher e¤ort in the second contest can be explained by both, selection and strategic or commitment e¤ects.
Regression analysis
To further test our predictions we proceed with a multivariate analysis. Table 4 presents the results of three sets of regressions. 17 In all estimations we control for whether each player was a winner in the previous contest. Moreover, we include socioeconomic information from the post-experimental questionnaire and a number of individual-speci…c control variables generated in post-experimental Table 4 : Estimation results.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. Estimations (1) to (4) exclude three outliers who indicated in the post-experimental questionnaire that they had severe di¢ culties in understanding the bidding mechanism.
tests. All regressions include "e¤ort if V=0" which is the e¤ort exerted in a zero-prize contest, "risk_general,"which is a self-reported measure for the willingness to take risk on an increasing scale from 0 to 10 and "risk_lottery," which measures the number of investments in lotteries with di¤erent win probabilities (on a scale from 0 to 5). We control for e¢ ciency-searching behavior in individual two-person allocation decisions, for loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, optimism, and pessimism. As socioeconomic variables we further include age, gender, …eld of study, semester, number of siblings, and the willingness to compete in daily life (deduced from their self-reported participation in a) lotteries, in b) card games and cardboard games, and in c) sports contests or other types of contests). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the bid b i that players place for a restart. In line with the non-parametric tests we …nd that winners place a lower bid than losers. In column (2), "e¤ort x i " also controls for the e¤ort expended in the contest. 18 We …nd that keeping the e¤ort level constant, the in ‡uence of being a winner continues to be negative. We …nd that bids only increase by 0:3 points for every unit of e¤ort exerted, although they should increase by 1 point (as independent of being a winner or a loser, the cost of e¤ort in the former contest is completely reimbursed if a restart takes place).
The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is our …rst measure for the joy of winning. Hence, the left-hand side variable in these estimations is overbidding
We …nd that overbidding is much higher for winners than for losers, in line with result 1. In column (4), controlling for the e¤ort expended we …nd the mirror image of column (2): As the observed bids underreact to e¤ort, our overbidding measure is lower the higher e¤ort is. Moreover, in all four regressions we …nd that bids or bid di¤erences increase with "risk_lottery". This measures the number of times a player invests in lotteries with di¤erent exogenous win probabilities in the post-test, and thus measures some kind of risk loving together with being a control for the joy of playing a lottery. None of the other individual-speci…c characteristics that we obtained from our various post-tests and the questionnaire has explanatory power for any of our joy of winning measures.
In columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable is our second measure for the joy of winning, i.e. the change in self-reported satisfaction that is induced by playing the …rst contest against a human contestant. We …nd that the change in satisfaction is signi…cantly more positive for winners than for losers, in line with result 2. Standard theory predicts that the ones with the highest payo¤ (winners) should exhibit the highest satisfaction. Therefore, as controlling for payo¤ directly would already pick up whether someone is a winner or a loser, we control for individual e¤ort in column (6) . With every unit of e¤ort expended (controlling for being a winner or loser), the increase in satisfaction is 0:01 units smaller, i.e. player's satisfaction also depends on monetary outcomes. As winners earn 500 tokens more than losers, their satisfaction increase from the monetary side amounts to 5 points. Hence, the monetary e¤ect is larger than the non-monetary utility of winning.
Result 5 The higher increase in satisfaction by winners compared to losers can be explained by monetary payo¤ .
We do not think that monetary payo¤ is the only explanatory variable for satisfaction di¤erences. Before, we have seen that the reactions to winning or losing are stronger in the restarted contest, although the monetary consequences are almost the same. Yet, if we wanted to change the status of a winner (to a loser) while keeping the payo¤ constant, we would need to run a further treatment in which losers earn 500 tokens and winners earn, e.g. 1000 tokens. Using this setup, we could check whether the satisfaction increase from gaining 500 x tokens di¤ers between winners and losers.
Discussion
We have presented evidence that winning in an experimental contest has additional consequences on top of the allocative ones: Winners are more satis…ed than losers and when asked how much they are willing to pay in order to play again, they bid more than a theory model without such non-monetary utility e¤ects would predict. In this section we want to shortly present other explanations that might exist for our observations.
The hot hand bias, a phenomenon …rst discussed by Gilovich et al. (1985) , 19 suggests that winners believe to win with a higher likelihood when playing again. Therefore, they would overbid and losers would underbid. The gambler's fallacy, according to which random sequences exhibit systematic reversals, suggests that winning players believe to lose the next time. Therefore, they would underbid and losers overbid. Our data are more in line with the hot hand bias, although this is a behavioral bias that is usually applied to stochastic events, whereas in our case the players can in ‡uence their winning probability by choosing their e¤ort levels and randomness is therefore reduced. Another caveat is that bids for a restart by both winners and losers exhibit some tendency towards zero. Thus, the results we obtain on the di¤erences in bids (compared to the expected value of a restart) could at least also partly be explained "by construction". However, our data on the satisfaction measure for the joy of winning and the frustration of losing should be una¤ected by any of the above mentioned biases (the hot hand, gambler's fallacy, and reversion to zero). Satisfaction di¤erences con…rm our results for the incentivized measure, but they can be explained by monetary considerations.
Another line of argument includes relative standing or status considerations, that is, players are better o¤ in terms of utility when they are ahead of the other player. However, note that winning players in our experiment would then not have an incentive to overbid for playing the contest again, as there is some probability of giving up the pole position in the next contest. In even starker contrast stands the behavior of losing players who should bid a lot for their chance of obtaining the pole position in the next contest if they are driven by relative standing considerations, but this is not what we observe.
An interesting treatment variation would be to analyze a proportional prize contest instead of a winner-takes-all contest. This alternative rule has also received attention in the literature. In such a contest, one pays out shares of the prize according to players'win probabilities. By paying out shares, expected payo¤s stay the same, but realized payo¤s change. In such an environment, we expect to see less of a joy of a winning or a frustration of losing if players always receive that part of the prize that they have a claim on by their winning probability. Another treatment variation where we predict a null-result concerns the …nding on visually tight outcomes. Here, an interesting placebo test would be to eliminate the arrow on the fortune wheel. Then, players do not take one outcome as tight and another one as sure anymore.
Conclusion
Among the established results of human behavior in experimental lottery contests is the fact that players typically overexert e¤ort and that e¤ort levels are very heterogeneous across individuals. A common explanation is that there are heterogeneous perceptions of the prize value because for some players winning in itself is worth a lot, while others only care about the monetary value of the prize. With our experiment we aimed at providing evidence for the existence of such an individual-speci…c joy of winning in experimental contests. We do so by letting players bid for a restart of the contest, which eliminates the monetary payo¤s from the former contest. We think that this paper should be welcome to all experimental economists who work on contests and who claim that the joy of winning and its counterpart, the frustration of losing, can explain part of their data.
We …nd that players who have just won a contest bid much more than the monetary value of a restart for playing the contest again. Furthermore, players who have just lost a contest bid much less than the monetary value of a restart for playing the contest again. We interpret this as evidence for the joy of winning and the frustration of losing. A second, non-incentivized measure con…rms our …ndings: Self-reported emotional states on happiness or satisfaction increase for winners, but decrease for losers.
E¤ort in a zero-prize contest, a value that has been used to measure the joy of winning in the literature, is not correlated with our incentivized measure nor with our non-incentivized measure. Thus, this measure should be interpreted with caution. We have investigated di¤erences in both of our measures a bit further and …nd that the e¤ects are larger if the outcome comes unexpected and if it is illustrated as a tight outcome.
On average, e¤ort in the restarted contest is higher than in the original contest. This is due to selection of high e¤ort types, but also because these types increase their e¤ort level even further after selecting into the contest a second time. The higher e¤ort level also has implications for overall e¢ ciency of the contest. Because of the higher level of e¤ort expended, players who select into the restarted contest are on average worse o¤ (in terms of payo¤). They might be happy about winning the contest for the …rst time, but the happiness does not translate into their pockets. A.4 Robustness of regressions 
A.2 Distribution of bids
(1)(2)
A.5 Instructions
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Welcome to this experiment! Please read the following instructions carefully and entirely. A precise understanding of the instructions can help you to gain more money.
Occasionally you might need to wait for the progress of the experiment. We kindly ask you not to eat, read or use your mobile phone during the experiment. Anything that distracts your attention from the experiment is prohibited. Please note that you are by no means allowed to communicate with other participants. If you violate any of these rules, you will be immediately excluded from the experiment without receiving any payment. If you have any questions please raise your hand. We will be happy to help you.
The experiment consists of several consecutive parts. Your decisions in one part do not impact any other part. In each part you can earn tokens with 50 tokens being equal one euro.
Part 1
What is it about? Your task is to count the digit zero in a numerical sequence. If your input is incorrect, you can enter your answer again. As soon as you have entered the correct number of zeros, new numerical sequences will be generated.
How many rounds are there? This task will be repeated 15 times. Thus, you have to answer 15 numerical sequences correctly.
What do I earn in part 1?
In this part you earn 750 tokens, independent of the number of tries you need. Your earnings serve as your endowment for part 2.
Part 2
What is it about?
After having successfully completed part 1, part 2 will start. In each round of the second part, two participants choose their "investment" simultaneously and independently. The two participants' investments in ‡uence their probability to receive 500 tokens for themselves in part 2. Every participant can choose any amount between 0 and 250 tokens as investment. The amount entered has to be paid to the laboratory.
How does one round proceed?
After both participants have chosen their investment, they will see both investments on the screen. The investments a¤ect which of the two participants will receive the 500 tokens. One participant's probability of success, i.e. the probability that this participant receives the 500 tokens, corresponds to the proportion in his invested tokens on the total amount of tokens invested by him and the other participant. The following applies:
Success probability= own investment own investment + the other participant's investment . Therefore, the participant who invests more will not automatically receive the 500 tokens. The more tokens a participant invests, however, the more likely he will receive the 500 tokens. Obviously, he then has to pay more tokens to the laboratory. If in one round both participants decide to invest 0 tokens, the probability of success for both participants will be 50%.
The probabilities of success will be shown on the screen as a pie chart, which is divided into two colors. The division arises proportionally out of the two participants' invested tokens. A pointer will rotate slowly on the circular area and randomly stop at one point of the circle. The greater one participant's probability of success, the bigger is his area within the circle and the more likely the pointer will stop in his area. Hence, depending on the area in which the pointer stops, participant 1 or 2 will receive the 500 tokens.
How many rounds are there?
The procedure described above under part 2 will be repeated several times. During rounds 1-4, the investment of your co-player will be generated automatically by the computer. This investment of the co-player corresponds to the typical behavior of other participants in the past. The …rst four rounds will not be paid out. They will help you, however, to gather some experience within the decision-making situation in part 2. After that you will play against another participant of this experiment. For that, the computer will randomly form groups of two. You will not know who your paired participant is.
What do I earn in part 2?
Only one round will be paid out in part 2. With your decisions you a¤ect which round will be paid. If you win in the round that is relevant for your payment, you will gain 500 tokens minus your investment in tokens. If instead your player wins, you will have to pay your investment and you will not receive any further payment. That means that you have to pay your investment regardless of receiving the 500 tokens or not.
Part 3 Information about part 3 will appear on the screen at the appropriate time. In this part, all of the participants run through the same 11 scenarios, from which one relevant for payment.
Summary At the end of today's experiment, your revenues from all parts of the experiment are added up and converted into euros. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 6 euros. In any case the total amount of euros will be positive. You will receive your money in cash from the laboratory.
What else should I consider?
Before the experiment starts, questions about the process of the experiment are going to appear on the screen. These questions clarify the rules of the experiment by means of examples. Furthermore, we will ask you for some more information during the experiment as well as afterwards; of course all your information is used anonymously. If there is a health-related or technical emergency during the experiment, please press the F1 button.
Thank you for your appearance. Good luck for the experiment!
